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How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower |  | Author: Adrian Goldsworthy
Publisher: Yale University Press
Category: eBooks
This item is no longer available
Rating:  reviews
Sales Rank: 12254
Format: Kindle Book
Media: Kindle Edition
Pages: 560
Number Of Items: 1
Dewey Decimal Number: 937
ASIN: B0029F1C1U
Publication Date: May 5, 2009
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| Editorial Reviews:
Amazon.com Review
Amazon Best of the Month, May 2009: Adrian Goldsworthy's Caesar: Life of a Colossus was a masterly fusion of vivid historical biography and scholarly detail, an impeccably researched work that also succeeded as a compelling read. With How Rome Fell, Goldsworthy's eye turns to the forces that ultimately destroyed the Roman Empire, challenging the traditional assumption that Rome was sacked by ultimately irrepressible foreign armies. Goldsworthy asserts that Rome's foes in the death throes of empire weren't any more formidable than those at its peak, but that the cutthroat nature of its political system fractured and diverted forces better spent maintaining the integrity of provincial borders--it was civil war and paranoia that destroyed the empire from within. Drawing parallels to modern societies might be tempting, but Goldsworthy is interested in Rome and resists foreboding or moralistic tones--even making a point of acknowledging the different dynamics that drive the rise and fall current powers. In just over 400 pages, How Rome Fell speeds the both the casual and Rome-savvy reader through 400 years of tumultuous and world-changing history--it's a worthy successor to the triumph of Caesar.--Jon Foro
Product Description
In AD 200, the Roman Empire seemed unassailable. Its vast territory accounted for most of the known world. By the end of the fifth century, Roman rule had vanished in western Europe and much of northern Africa, and only a shrunken Eastern Empire remained. What accounts for this improbable decline? Here, Adrian Goldsworthy applies the scholarship, perspective, and narrative skill that defined his monumental Caesar to address perhaps the greatest of all historical questions—how Rome fell. It was a period of remarkable personalities, from the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius to emperors like Diocletian, who portrayed themselves as tough, even brutal, soldiers. It was a time of revolutionary ideas, especially in religion, as Christianity went from persecuted sect to the religion of state and emperors. Goldsworthy pays particular attention to the willingness of Roman soldiers to fight and kill each other. Ultimately, this is the story of how an empire without a serious rival rotted from within, its rulers and institutions putting short-term ambition and personal survival over the wider good of the state. How Rome Fell is a brilliant successor to Goldsworthy's "monumental" (The Atlantic) Caesar.
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| Customer Reviews:
 A new look at Rome's fall August 28, 2010
William Pilon (Roswell, GA United States)
Goldsworthy's thesis is that the chief cause of the Western Roman Empire's fall, was not Barabrian incursions, the decline of moral values or lead poisoning, but mostly the fact that they couldn't get a stable system of Imperial succession. After the death of Marcus Aurelius it was a rare decade that didn't have some sort of Roman Civil War either because of disputed succession, or because of Roman generals attempting to usurp the Imperial purple. Furthermore, these constant civil wars not only squandered blood and treasure that could have made the empire more secure, but they made it imperative that whoever was reigning at the time try to limit the amount of military force was available to potential rebels. Generally by keeping the number of troops and fortifications in the outer provinces as low as possible, sometimes too low to successfully deter barbarian raids, or effectively punish them afterwards.
I don't know enough about the topic to definitely agree or disagree with Goldsworthy, but he makes a good case and he definitely makes me want to read more about it.
Highly recommended!
How Half Of It Fell, Anyway June 26, 2010
Thomas (Apopka, Florida USA)
1 out of 3 found this review helpful
The answer to the question of how Rome fell depends in large measure on how one defines "Rome" and "falling." Adrian Goldsworthy's entertaining account of this era depicts the considerable change of conditions in the Western Empire from the second century through the sixth century while at the same time downplaying the popular picture of a sudden demise. Odoacer's Gothic mastery of Roman leadership in 476 was as much symbolic as substantial, a milestone in the evolution of Western Europe.
Goldsworthy begins his tale with the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius [161-180]. We remember him as a kind of philosopher king, but in truth it is his travels more than his writings that merit attention. Aurelius fought much more than he wrote, and he did so in many different parts of the empire. Many of his subjects never knew where he was, and many thought he was dead long before his time.
One very basic problem for Aurelius was the size of the Empire: it was too big. The author never quite explains how it got this way. In some instances expansion had been critical: North Africa, for example, became the Iowa of the Empire, sending barges of foodstuffs to the Italian peninsula where large portions of the population were fed as a public service. It is less clear how Roman conquests of Britain and Germany added much to the empire except in terms of security. Defending these borders was costly and eventually bellicose. That Aurelius had to personally lead armies to various breaking points on the Empire's borders is indicative of significant changes in both the structure of the army and the security of the throne itself.
Divisions in the army were nothing new and dated to Julius Caesar's time, but after Aurelius they became epidemic, to the point that more blood was spilt inside the boundaries than defending them. For the next century Rome witnessed a rapid turnover of emperors, and not unexpectedly the cozy and workable relationship between emperor and senate declined. Rome was never a republic in the modern sense, but the senate had generally served as a mollifying force and a valued tax base in a society that was surprisingly socialist. The sheer size of Roman government--its bureaucracy, military, public works--is quite remarkable; to these now came the added royal expense of remaining in power. The miracle is that the western empire did not bankrupt itself sooner than it did. Goldsworthy examines archaeological evidence of economic decline, such as greater dependence upon wood than stone in fortifications.
Rome's last best hopes were Diocletian [284-305] and Constantine [306-337]. Both men achieved substantial military control of the Empire, and both reigned long enough to achieve a measure of stabilization. Both men also understood that financially and militarily Rome was overextended, though each approached the problem with considerably differing strategies. Diocletian returned to the old model of dual government, the proconsul [now two-Augusti] mode, but upon his and his colleague's retirement factional struggles returned and continued until Constantine's victory at the Mulvian Bridge put him in position to claim legitimate mastery of much of the Empire.
Constantine's mode of reform--which would change Western Civilization--was his decision to divide the Empire itself into East and West. This solution was a bonanza to the eastern half, eventually based not surprisingly in Constantinople and virtually untroubled by its neighbors for several centuries to come. Conversely, the decision further weakened the western portion, variously centered in Rome, Ravenna, and other sites whose stormy and extensive boundaries now invited what history has called barbarian invasions.
Goldsworthy discusses the "invasion" in great detail. In its early phase, the fourth century, the process resembled homesteading as much as anything. Small independent clusters or clans in benign numbers settled previously unoccupied land, primarily on the northern boundary. In truth Rome was glad to have them there as something of a buffer between the Empire and more populous areas. However, a weakened West emboldened more adventurous bands of outside intruders, whose interests were plunder and slaves more than land. Invaders such as Alaric and Attila never really intended conquest in the sense of land occupation; their small and quarrelsome bands made land conquest unthinkable. Frequently they were bought off to avoid excessive damage and bloodshed.
What appears to have happened in the fifth century, however, was the utilization of small barbarian armies by Roman factions wrestling for the emperorship, despite its rapidly diminishing worth. As this factionalism was a chronic condition, there was more incentive for Goths and others to remain as permanent players. Foreigners became prominent in the Roman military, intermarried, and acculturated themselves to a point where an Odoacer could become western king in full view of the sitting senate. Other later peoples, such as the Vandals, were simply scavenging opportunists.
It was the sixth century that probably resembles what we imagine by the term "fall of Rome." But even here terms are deceptive. "Fall" was actually a collective word for a lower standard of living, a trend toward decentralization and cultural diversity. As the author observes, by 600 Rome and the Western Empire were dead in the sense that the Roman West looked nothing like it did in Hadrian's day. And yet this does not mean that nothing took its place. One example is the ascendancy of the Christian clergy, notably bishops such as Leo the Great and Gregory the Great, who gradually crafted a new modus vivendi of civic identity and organization.
From the safety and prosperity of the new Eastern Rome, Constantinople, the idea of a "dark age" was laughable, at least until the eighth century when Islamic militarism became a serious and continuous preoccupation. Constantinople was the Roman that never fell to outsider, at least until the apocalyptic year of 1453. Events in the West may have produced scorn, pity, confusion, and opportunism. For this half of the Empire, the party was just beginning.
Good history, slack prose May 23, 2010
K. Braithwaite (inkster, MI USA)
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Goldsworthy brings a lot of common snesne to his analysis, and argues his case well. It's good interesting narrative and analysis. But the prose is slack. He needs an editor. Massively, as he says far too often.
An interesting look at the end of the empire May 11, 2010
Thomas Paul (Plainview, NY USA)
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
Adrian Keith has written a detailed account of the end of the Roman Empire that makes a good argument for why the Empire fell. The book starts from the high point of the Empire in 150AD and works its way to the end of the Empire in the West in 476AD and beyond. Keith shows us how the Empire ultimately had a weak base simply because the man with the biggest army could make a claim to be Emperor. This meant that any general with a strong army could claim to be Emperor which meant that letting any general have a strong army was risky for an Emperor.
The main problem with the book is simply that so little information is available for this period. Keith explains that information such as the population of Rome or the number of soldiers in the army or the number of dead from a plague are simply not available. The information that is available was often written 100 years after the event or was written by biased authors (Christian authors writing about pagan emperors, for example). This means that there are a lot of blank spaces in the story. What was it like to live in Rome when the power of the Emperor had moved to other cities? What was it like to be a citizen of the Empire when civil wars (60 in the third century) were the normal condition of life? What was it like in the Empire during the transition from paganism to Christianity? But are all of these questions left unanswered because of lack of information or is it that Keith simply failed to discuss them? Surely some information must be available.
For me though, the main problem is the last 75 years of the story. Things didn't seem too bad in 375AD but then a short time later the house of cards collapses. The Goths are defeated by Theodosius and yet 15 years later they are sacking Rome. I felt that Keith didn't make it clear as to exactly why this happened. Why the Roman army ended up disappearing to the point where barbarians make up a good deal of the army is not made clear. But perhaps this is unknowable at this point. Was it plague? Was it the effect of civil wars? The effect of the splitting of the empire? All of these things? Keith doesn't discuss this question in any detail leaving it mostly for the reader to guess.
But all in all I did enjoy this book and found Keith's theories of why the empire fell to make sense and be presented in a way that makes them understandable. I finished the book feeling that I know a lot more about the fall of the Roman Empire and what replaced it. This is a tough subject for a writer because of the lack of first person narrative available for huge chunks of it but Keith does a good job with the information that is available.
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